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of the number allowed in the charter, and if this is to be the effect
it is just to give him a hearing, as it was to give the plaintiff a
hearing before his expulsion. The argument on both sides has
been able and exhaustive of the learning on the points discussed, to
only one of which, preliminary to any examination of the merits,
have we found it necessary to give attention.
There is no error, and the plaintiff is not entitled to his writ.
It is so adjudged.
No error. Affirmed.
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N ATTORNEY.
Agreement for Lien on Judgment as Compensation for Services-Set
off-Assignment.-An agreement between an attorney and his client
that the attorney shall have a lien upon a certain judgment to be
recovered, for a specified sum, as compensation for his services, consti-
tutes a valid equitable assignment of the judgment pro tanto which
attaches to the judgment as soon as entered: Terney v. Wilson, 16
Vroom.
The equity of the assignee under such an assignment is superior to
the claim of the judgment-debtor to set off against the judgment, a
judgment against the plaintiff which he, the debtor, had purchased
after the entry of the judgment against himself and before he had notice
of the assignment: Id.
A failure to give to the debtor notice of the assignment of the debt
will not subject the assignee to merely equitable claims of the debtor,
which do not attach to the debt itself and which accrue to him after
the assignment : Id.
I Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions.
The cases will probably appear in 109 U. S.
2 From J. H. Lumpkin, Esq., Reporter. The cases will probably appear in 68
or 69 Ga. Reports.
3 From T. K. Skinker, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 77 Mo. Reports.
4 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 16 Vroom Reports.
5 From G. D. W. Vroom, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 16 Vroom Reports.
6 From Hon. A. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 58 Wisconsin ]Reports.
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BANK.
Authority of Cashier.-A banking corporation, whose charter does
not otherwise provide, may be represented by its cashier in transactions
outside of his ordinary duties without his authority to do so being in
writing, or appearing in the records of the proceedings of the-directors:
his authority may be by parol and collected from circumstances, or
implied from the conduct and acquiescence of the directors : Martin
et al. v. Webb et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
. BILLS AND NOTES.
Accommodation Maker-Discharge of by Indulgence to ndorser.-
After the indorsement of a promissory note, the maker stands in the
position of an acceptor of a bill of exchange and the indorser in that of
the drawer. As to the holder, the maker or acceptor is primarily liable,
and the indorser or drawer is secondarily liable. In a suit by the
holder the maker or acceptor may plead ,and prove that he stood in the
position of a mere accommodation acceptor, and, therefore, a surety;
that the holder knew this fact and that the maker was not interested
in the note before taking it; that the holder had extended the time of
payment for a valuable consideration promised by the indorser, without
the consent of the maker, and that the indorser had become insolvent:
Hall v. Calpital Bank of Macon, 68 or 69 Ga.
Indulgence by the holder to the acceptor without the consent of the
drawers, who were mere sureties, granted for a consideration, has been
held to discharge such sureties; and the same principle will apply to
this case: Id.
Inland Bill- Consideration-leading.-An instrument in this form:
"Building committee will pay G. W. T. the sum of $126.25, and
charge to (signed) N. and L.," is an inland bill of exchange, and as
such, under the law merchant, imports a consideration without the
words " value received." In declaring upon such an instrument no
consideration need be alleged : Taylor v. ewman, 77 Mo.
Parol Evidence to show that Maker was Agent of Third Person.-
In an action for money paid to the use of defendant, it appeared that
plaintiff had been obliged to pay a note made by one B., and indorsed
by plaintiff at B.'s request. Defendant's name did not appear upon
the note ; but parol evidence was admitted to show that in obtaining
plaintiff's indorsement B. was acting as defendant's agent. Held, that
there was no error in admitting this evidence : Saner v. Brinker, 77
Mo.
Transfer after Maturity-Set off.-A negotiable promissory note
transferred after maturity, passes into the hands of the indorsee subject
only to such equities and defences as are connected with the note itself,
not such as grow out of distinct and independent contracts. The
statute of set off (R. S. 1879, § 3868), is not applicable to negotiable
paper. Overruling Munday v. Clements, 58 Mo. 577 : Cutler v. Cook,
77 Mo.
COMMON CARRIER. See Ferry.
CONTRACT.
* Alternative-Right of Election in Promisor.-When an obligation is
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in the alternative, as to do a thing upon one day or another, or in one
way or another, the right of election is with the promisor if there is
nothing in the contract to control that presumption : Dessert v. Scott
et al., 58 Wis.
A contract for the sale of lands, made September 25th 1878, provided
that the amount due to the state on the land should be deducted from
the purchase-money, and "if any interest due the state for the year
1878, or anything later, parties of the first part to pay the same to
January-lst 1879, or up to the time of closing this sale." Both parties
expected the sale would be closed prior to January 1st 1879, but,
through no fault of the vendors it was not.so closed until April 7th
1879. Held, that the vendors were not bound to pay the interest due
to the state for the year 1879, which was by law "payable in advance
on the 1st day of January, or on or before the 31st day of May there-
after": ld.
CORPORATION. See Railroad.
Liability of Stockholders.-A state statute authorizing the formation
of corporations for manufacturing, &c., provided that "All the stock-
holders of every company incorporated under this act shall be severally
individually liable to the creditors of the company in which they are stock-
holders to an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them respect-
ively, for all debts and contracts made by such company, until the
whole amount of the capital stock fixed and limited by such company
shall have been paid in, and a certificate thereof shall have been made,"
&c. field, that the individual liability of the stockholders thus arising
was not in the nature of a penalty, but was based on a contract between
the stockholders and the creditors of the company ; and hence that
this liability could be enforced outside of the limits of the state by which
the law was passed: Plash v. Conn, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
In such a case as the above the decision of the state court is entitled
to great, if not conclusive weight with the federal courts : Id.
COURTS.
Certificates of Iferior Courts-Mfandamus.-Certificates of inferior
courts as to what has transpired in their presence, cannot be contra-
dicted by affidavits : State v. Camp, 16 Vroom.
Mandamus will not be awarded to compel a court to do what, in its
discretion, it might lawfully refuse to do: Id.
CRImiNAL LAW.
Evidence- Dying Declarations-Admissibility.-G-reat caution is
necessary not only in the admission, but in the use of dying declara-
tions. The acts often occur under circumstances of confusion and
surprise, calculated to prevent accurate observation ; the consequences
of the violence may occasion an injury to the mind, and an indistinct-
ness of memory as to the transaction; the deceased may have stated
his conclusions, which may be wrong; he may have omitted important
particulars; he may give a partial account; or his passions may not
have subsided ; he is not subject to cross-examination ; and such dec-
larations as he makes are apt to have great weight with juries. Upon
the offer of such declarations the judge must decide upon the preliminary
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evidence in the first instance. If he deems it prima facie sufficient,
he should admit the declarations, instructing the jury afterwards to
pass finally for themselves on the question, whether or not the declara-
tions were conscious utterances in the apprehension and immediate
prospect of death. The admissibility and competency of the evidence
is for the judge to decide : iffitchell v. The State, 68 or 69 Ga.
Defence of Insanity-Burden of Proof.-It is not error to refuse to
charge that if there be a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury as
to the sanity of the accused, they should resolve the doubt in favor of
his insanity. The plea of insanity is a defence, and the burden of prov-
ing it is on the accused : Graves v. State, 16 Vroom.
The defence of insanity, while not disfavored by the law, is regarded
with jealousy, and in the interest of public justice it is subjected to a
close and careful scrutiny. It must be proved to the satisfaction of the
jury, and it may be established by the. preponderance of proof. In
other words, it must be sustained by the evidence : Id.
Practice-Newly-Discovered Eiddence.-A judgment of conviction
will be reversed where the trial court refuses to grant a new trial asked
on the ground of newly-discovered evidence which is relevant and
important, and which could not have been discovered until after the
trial: The State v. Curtis, 77 Mo.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Fraudulent Conveyance - Attachment - .LAemption - Burden of
Proof.-If a debtor sells his goods in order to defraud his creditors,
and the vendee purchases in order to aid in the perpetration of the
fraud, the sale is void as against creditors, no matter what price was
paid, or how early after the sale possession was taken, or how notorious
the change of possession : Stone v. Spencer, 77 Mo.
Where the right of an attaching creditor is contested by a trans-
feree of the debtor, on the ground that the goods in controversy were
exempt from attachment in the hands of the debtor: Held, that the
burden of proving such exemption was on the transferee: Id.
D ECEDENTS' ESTATES.
Legacy- Converson-Election to take Property-Power of Court to
electfor lnfant.-Where a testator directs that his executors shall sell
certain property and divide the proceeds among certain named legatees,
it is optional with such legatees to elect to take either the property
itself or the money arising from the sale thereof. The legacy is as much
of the property as of the proceeds of the sale ; and to allow the leg-
atees to take the property instead of the money arising from the sale is
no violation of the testamentary scheme: Swann v. Garrett, 68 or 69 Ga.
A court of equity has jurisdiction and power to elect for an infant
legatee, where upon due inquiry it shall appear to be for the interest
and advantage of the infant, that he shall take the property itself or
its proceeds. The interests of all the legatees are to be consulted as
well as that of the infant: Id.
DEED. See Not-ice.
EASEMENT. See Party-Wall.
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ERRORS AND APPEALS.
Order to apzswer andpayCosts.-An order requiring a party who has
refused to answer certain interrogatories in an examination before a
court commissioner, to appear before the commissioner and answer such
interrogatories and also to pay the costs of the proceedings already had
and $10 costs of the motion, is appealable. State ez rel. v. Lonsdale,
49 Wis. 348; Stuart v. Allen, 45 Id. 158, distinguished : Cleveland v.
Burnham, 58 Wis.
EXECUTION.
Joint Defendants-Release of Property of One-Surey-Discharge
of by Release of Principal.-A judgment creditor having a judgment
against several defendants may direct the officer holding the execution
to make the amount thereof out of the property of such of the defend-
ants as he may see fit to proceed against: .Ayde v. Rogers, Sheriff, 58
Wis.
The mere seizure of the property of one of such defendants does not
pay or satisfy the judgment, and if the property seised is released and
returned to the possession of the owner at his request, he cannot set up
such seizure as a payment or satisfaction of the judgment: Id.
But where one of th6 defendants stands as surety for the others or
some of them, the judgment creditor, if he knows that fact, cannot vol-
untarily release the property of the principal debtors which has been
seized upon the execution and then resort to the property of the surety.
Such a release works an extension of the time of payment to the prin-
cipal debtors, and the surety is thereby discharged: Id.
FERRY.
Liabilty of Ferrjman for Goods of Passenger.-The liability of a
ferryman with respect to property retained by a passenger within his own
control and management is not the same as that eincurred with respect
to goods delivered to him and placed within his control for trausporta-
tion. With respect to the latter, the ferryman undertakes for their safe
carriage as against all perils but such as arise from the act of God or
the public enemy; with respect to the former, his duty is to provide
his boat with such means and appliances as are adapted to the security
and safety of the passenger and his property, and to use such means
and appliances with skill and care. For a failure in the performance of
this duty, the ferryman will be liable if injury result: Dudley v. The
Camden and Philadeophia Ferry Co., 16 Vroom.
But if, in such a case, the passenger, by negligence in the care of pro.
perty of which he retains control, contributes to its loss or injury, he
cannot recover of the ferryman, though negligent: Id.
GIFT. See .Euity.
]HIGHWAY.
Side Track-Acquiescence of Town in use of-Notic&.-A town may,
by long acquiescence in the use of a side track as a part of the travelled
highway, become bound to keep the same in repair, although it has pro-
vided another sufficient track for public travel: Cartright v. Town of
Belmont, 58 Wis.
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To relieve itself from liability for the want of repair of a side track
which is equally as accessible and apparently as much travelled as the
prepared track, the town should give some reasonable notice to the
public travelling there that the use of such side-track is unauthorized
id.
Such notice may be given by placing obstructions in the side-track,
or by putting up notices or in any other manner which will sufficiently
notify travellers that the town desires them to use the graded track
alone: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Separate Acknowledgment by Wife.-In a suit to set aside a deed of
trust executed to secure the payment of a note signed by husband and
wife, and the acknowledgment of which was certified as required by
law, it was in proof that the wife signed the note and the deed, having
an opportunity to read both before signing them; she was before an
officer competent to take her acknowledgment, and he came into her
presence, at the request of the husband, to take it; and she knew, or
could have ascertained, while in the presence of the officer, as well to
what property the deed referred as the object of its execution: Held,
that the certificate must stand against a mere conflict of evidence as to
whether she willingly signed, sealed and delivered the deed, or had its
contents explained to her by the officer, or was examined privily and
apart from her husband; and that even if it be only prima facie evi-
dence of the facts therein stated, it cannot be impeached, in respect to
those facts, except upon proof which clearly and fully shows it to be
thlse or fraudulent: Young v. Duvall et al., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term
1883.
INFANT. See Decedents' Estates.
INSURANCE.
Agreement of Agent to renew Policy- Waiver of Proofs of Loss.-
If, previous to the expiration of a policy of insurance, the agent of the
company agrees orally to renew the policy, and that he will attend to
it right away, and the minds of the parties meet as to the terms of such
agreement, and nothing remains to be done except that the agent of the
company shall make out and deliver the renewal receipt and that the
insured shall then or at some subsequent time pay the premium,
the agreement is binding upon the company, and it can avoid liability
thereon only by tendering the renewal receipt and demanding the pre-
mium and the failure of the insured to pay the same, or by giving
notice to the insured, before a loss, that it refuses to carry the risk.
Taylor v. Phenix Zns. Co., 47 Wis. 365, distinguished: King v. ilekla
Fire Ins. Co., 58 Wis.
A denial by an insurance company, after a loss has occurred, of all
liability or that it had any risk on the property burned, constitutes a
waiver of the proofs of loss required by the policy : Id.
Accident Policy- Voluntary Exposure.-In an action upon a policy
of insurance against accidents a complaint alleging that the plaintiff
while travelling by railway fell asleep from weariness and the motion of
the cars, and when it was quite dark, " and while he was in a dozed and
unconscious condition of mind, and not knowing or realizing what he
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was dolig, involuntarily arose from his seat and walked unconsciously to
the platform of the car, and, without fault on his part, fell therefrom
to the ground," and was injured, held sufficiently to show that the in-
juries were not "self-inflicted" and were not the result of "design" or
Cvoluntary exposure to unnecessary danger" within the meaning of
conditions exempting the insurer from liability: Scheiderer v. Travellers'
Ins. Co., 58 Wis.
Construction of Agency Clause- Contract not varied by Evidence of
Custo.-A fire insurance policy contained this clause: "'This insurance
may be terminated at any time at the request of the assured, in which
case the company shall retain only the customary shord rates for the
time the policy has been in force. The insurance may also be termi-
nated at any time at the option of the company on giving notice to
that effect and refunding a rateable proportion of the premium for
the unexpired term of the policy. It is a part of this contract that
any person other than the assured, who may have procured the insurance
to be taken by this company, shall be deemed to be the agent of the
assured named in this policy, and not of this company under any cir-
cumstances whatever, or in any transactions relating to this insurance :"
Held, that this clause imports nothing more than that the person obtain-
ing the insurance was to be deemed the agent of the insured in matters
immediately connected with the procurement of the policy; that where
his employment did not extend beyond the procurement of the insurance,
his agency ceased upon the execution of the policy, and subsequent
notice to him of its termination by the company was not notice to the
insured: Grace et al. v. Ins. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
Parol evidence of usage or custom among insurance men to give
such notice to the person procuring the insurance was inadmissible to
vary the terms of the contract: Id.
JUDGMENT. See Attorney.
Nunc pro tune Judgment-EJffect of.-In order that a nunc pro tune
entry of judgment may bind a person who is not a party thereto (such
as a surety in a supersedeas bond given on appeal from the judgment
as first entered), it must appear that he had notice of the judgment
really rendered at the time his rights were acquired or his liability fixed
thereunder, or that he had notice of the application to have the nune
pro tune entry and made an opportunity to appeal therefrom: Eoch v.
The Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Co., 77 Mo.
LEGACY. See Decedents' Estates.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.
Reasonable Cause-Express .Malice.-An action for a malicious pros-
ecution cannot be maintained, even though express malice be shown, if
the defendant had good reason to believe and did believe, when he made
complaint,.that the plaintiff had committed the offence charged: Xur-
phy v. Martin, 58 Wis.
MIASTER AND SERVANT.
Railroad- Waiver by Enployee of Right to Sue for Injuries.-An
employee of a railroad company may by contract waive his right to sue
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for injuries not arising from criminal negligence on the part of the com-
pany, or its other employees, but any negligence, either of omission or
commission, on the part of other employees of the road, in connection
with their business, from which serious injury results, constitutes crim-
inal negligence, and a contract waiving the right to sue for injuries
resulting therefrom is contrary to public policy and void: Cook v.
Western & Atlanta Railroad, 68 or 69 Ga.
Railroad-Necgligence-Co-employee-In an action against a railroad
company to recover for the death of a locomotive engineer, killed while
on duty, through the negligence of the train dispatcher, the plaintiff
failed to show that the train dispatcher and the engineer were not fellow-
servants. Held, that for this omission the plaTintiff was properly non-
suited: Blessing v. The St. Louis, Kansas City & Northern Railway
Co., 77 Mo.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See Highway.
NEGLIGENCE. See Ferry; Master and Servant.
Damage-Remote Results-Failure of Theatre Company to Perform
by Reason of Delay of Train.-Damages recoverable for a breach of
contract are such as arise naturally and according to the usual course
of things from such breach and such as the parties contemplated when
the contract was made as the probable result of its breach: Georgia
Railroad v. Hayden, 68 or 69 Ga.
A theatrical manager purchased tickets for himself and troupe over a rail-
road, at the terminus of which they were to take a connecting train and
proceed to a point at which a performance was to be given. Tickets had
been sold to this performance to the amount of $288. There had been
a collision of other trains on the first railroad, and the train taken by
plaintiff was delayed so as to miss connection with the other train;
plaintiff failed to reach his destination, and the money was refunded to
the purchasers of seats. At the point of delay, late at night, plaintiff
first notified the railroad company of his arrangements, but it did not
appear that the telegram was received in time to remedy the difficulty.
Held, that the damages resulting from the particular character of the
business of the traveller, unknown to the railroad company contracting
with him, were too remote to be recovered: Id.
Evidence-Contributory Negligence-Question for Juriy.-The mere
fact that a person attempting to cross a bridge on a dark night knows
that it is not provided with a railing, will not prevent him from recover-
ing damages for injuries sustained in falling from the bridge if he falls
without fault or negligence on his own part: Loewer v. The City of
Sedalia, 77 Mo.
Whether the want of a warning light at a bridge at night, tends to
establish negligence, depends upon the character of the danger, as aris-
ing from the situation, condition and use of the bridge, and is properly
a question of fact for the jury: Id.
Where the question was whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence in using a dangerous sidewalk when he might have walked
in the roadway, Held, that this was for the jury, and not the court, to
determine: Id.
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NOTICE.
Record of Defective or Irregular Deed.-In order to be constructive
notice to subsequent purchasers the record of a deed or other instru-
ment affecting the title to land must show upon its face that such in-
strument was so executed and acknowledged as to entitle it to be
recorded: Girardin v. Lampe, 58 Wis.
PARTY-WALL.
Nature of Ownersii-Rihts of Owners.-The owners of a party-wall
standieg in part upon the lot of each are not tenants in common, but
each owns in severalty so much of the wall as stands upon his lot, sub-
ject to the easement of the other owner for its support and the equal
use thereof as an exterior wall of his building. And the owner on one
side may, within the limits of his own lot, increase the thickness, length,
or height of the wall, if he can do so without injury to the building on
the adjoining lot: Andrae v. Haseltine, 58 Wis.
PRESUMPTION.
Death-Absencefor Seven Years-Burden of Proof-A person who
absents himself from this state for seven successive years is presumed
to be dead, and the party asserting that he is living must prove it:
Hloyt v. Newbold, 16 Vroom.
After the presumption of death arises, the burden of proof is on the
party denying the death to show that the person is alive and to overcome
the presumption by proof: Id.
There should be something more than similarity of name to overcome
the presumption of death raised by the statute. The identity of the
person should be proved: Id.
RAILROAD. See Master and Servant
Subscription to Stock-Guarantee of Route.-Proof that certain of
the promotors of a railroad scheme guaranteed that the route would pass
near to a certain tract of land, accompanied with proof of a deviation
from such line, will not be sufficient to discharge a subscriber who had
subscribed in reliance on such statement, there being no evidence
tending to show any fraudulent intent: Braddock v. The PhiladeIphia,
.Marlton and Medford Railroad Co., 16 Vroom.
SHERIFF.
Amercement-Evidence.-On a motion to amerce a sheriff for neglect-
ing to levy a writ of ft. fa., the plaintiff is not required to show with pre-
cision the value of the property on which levy might have been made. It
is enough if he show that the neglect has deprived him of a substantial
benefit under his writ: White v. Rockafellar, 16 Yroom.
False Return-Liability for-Damages.-Under the statute (R.
S. 1879, § 2401,) an officer to whom an execution is delivered, in case
he makes a false return on the writ, is liable for the whole amount of
money directed to be levied. Held, that where the falsity consisted in
stating that the writ was ordered to be returned satisfied by plaintiff's
attorneys, an amendment by leave of court striking out the false state-
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ment was no defence to an action for the false return: State v. Case,
77 Mo.
Corby v. Burns, 36 Mo. 194, distinguished, on the ground that in that
case the amendment was in conformity with the facts : Id.
A plea of insolvency of defendant in the execution, is no defence to
an action against a sheriff and his sureties upon his official bond for
making a false return: Id.
Where no damages are proven, a sheriff is not liable, even for nom-
inal damages, for failure to return an execution at the time fixed by
law: Id.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See Eqjuity.
SURETY. See Execution.
Cashier-Defaulter at Time of giving Bond.-A surety upon the
bond of a cashier of a bank is not discharged by the mere fact that the
cashier was, at the time the bond was given, a defaulter. Nor will the
neglect of the bank to ascertain that fact discharge him: Bowne v.
Mount Holly National Bank, 16 Vroom
Rule of Construction as to Matters Collateral to Contract.-The rule
that the contract of a surety is to be construed strictly, applies only to
the contract itself, and not to matters collateral and incidental, or which
arise in execution of it, which are to be governed by the same rules
that apply in like circumstances, whatever the relation of the parties :
Warren v Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term, 1883.
UNITED STATES COURTS. See Corporation.
Jurisdiction Dependent on Citizenship .- When jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court depends upon the citizenship of the parties, such citizen-
ship, or the facts which in legal intendment constitute it, must be dis-
tinctly and positively averred in the pleadings, or appear affirmatively
and with equal distinctness in other parts of the record. An averment
that parties reside, or that a firm does business in a particular state, or
that a firm is "of" that state, is not sufficient to show citizenship in
such state : Grace et al. v. Insurance Co., S. C . U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
Where the record does not show a case within the jurisdiction of a
Circuit Court, this court will take notice of that fact, although no
question as to jurisdiction has been raised by the parties : Id.
WILL.
Execution of a Power.-Where the donee of a power executes an
instrument, which is making -a disposition of the property, within the
scope of the power, but the power is not referred to therein, and it is
necessary, in order for the instrument to have its due legal effect, to
construe it as an exercise of the power, it will be so regarded : Warner
v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1883.
The power to incumber an estate "by way of mortgage or trust deed,
or otherwise, and renew the same for the purpose of raising money to
pay off any and all incumbrances now on said property," is broad
enough to include the renewal and extension of an existing incumbrance
as well as the creation of a new one: id.
